Sell ​​private entries for less than those listed on the market?

In the meantime, critics claim that exclusive lists, especially on scale, create an uneven playing field. They claim that private networks benefit disproportionately to the brokers and agents who arrange the party line, while also giving the largest companies the biggest advantage in the recruitment and preservation of agent. Many also point to the fact that private lists essentially lock buyers with a lower income who rely on open MLS access. The result? A narrowing of opportunities and reduced market visibility that is contrary to the spirit of fair housing.

As an addition to concern, some critics suggest that double deals, often a by -product of these exclusive environments, can lead to lower sellers for sellers. In this light, some people see the strategy as a way to maximize control for companies and at the same time limit the benefit for consumers. Now new data offers an empirical lens that can be evaluated, and the results are EYE opening.

The market performance of double deals

By analyzing thousands of transactions from 2018 to 2024 at large companies, an important trend is emerging: on average double deals perform.

• Double deals that are sold on average for 6.36% above catalog price.
• Non-Double-End Deals sold for 8.06% above Catalogus Prize.

At first glance, that may not seem dramatic, but it corresponds to a 21% lower price performance in relative terms for consumers who use the same agent for both parties. And although there were isolated bijters, in the vast majority of the combinations of the business year, double deals were collected less than their non-double counterparts.

The data also reveals a disturbing pattern: the more often a company works on both sides of the transaction, the greater the chance that they are deals to deliver results under the market. In companies with double -ending rates consistently above 30%, the performance gap was further expanded.

A case study in scale and strategy

In selected markets and certain years, one large, well -known company has shown a considerably higher share of double deals; About double the average observed at the top 10 brokers that we have investigated in several markets.

Despite its size and scale, the double-sided deals of the company at the back of the analysis performed its non-Double-end-end-Deals. Even during the ultra -competitive markets of 2021 and 2022, when bidding wars were customary and many houses were sold far beyond the catalog price, transactions with double and more muffled profits showed.

Share list as a lever

To understand how this dynamic unfolds, it is important to investigate where certain companies have a dominant market share. In Boston, for example, one company checked 17.1% of the total market volume and a leading 11.3% of all offers. Similar patterns arise in markets such as Fort Lauderdale, San Francisco and Saint Petersburg, where concentrated list control companies gives a strategic advantage in facilitating internal transactions and internal matchmaking.

That is not necessarily bad until you look at the price data. The findings suggest that high double final percentages do not correlate with stronger results for sellers, but with the opposite. In many cases, double deals sold closer to the Catalog Prize sold or even below, especially in companies that had more control over mentioning inventory.

Policy in context: what happens if clear cooperation fades?

This is more than a data issue – it is a policy problem. The clear cooperation policy is designed to ensure that the government put on the market to achieve the public through the MLS if possible, which improves competition and visibility of consumers.

Some companies are now a challenge for that policy. Their approach focuses on private noting networks and internal exclusivity, aimed at supplying speed, control and convenience. But these benefits can be hidden.

The data is a difficult but important question: if double deals that occur more often in exclusive framework environments, produce routinely lower selling prices, do we really serve the consumer?

The path forward: transparency and competition

A more private process can rely on certain customers, but it should not be at the expense of market results. When fewer buyers see a list, fewer offers are made. Less competition often means lower end prices.

Although no policy is without mistakes, the principle of broad access and transparency remains fundamental to a fair market. And based on years of transaction data, open competition continues to produce stronger results than controlled exclusivity.

While the industry is debating about the future of clear cooperation, one thing is certain: the best results do not come from behind closed doors, but from an open market where every buyer gets a fair chance.

Diana Zaya is the founder and CEO of Maverick Systems.